tiltproof

Flopping a flush

I had a couple of tough days playing NLHE cash games over the weekend. I was winning some small pots and losing big ones, which always hurts. Some of it was bad situations, where I had a very strong hand but someone had a better one, but some of it could have been avoided, too. I made a couple of marginal calls, and didn't make a few big laydowns where I felt I was probably beat. It's really hard to come out ahead if you can't lay down what may be the best hand, because losing a big pot or even a whole buy-in is brutal to your win rate.

Tonight I had a much better night, and felt like I was very much on my game. I made some nice hands and got action on them from much worse ones, and I doubled up on both tables I was playing.

Here's a hand I really enjoyed. It was interesting during the hand, and it gave me some food for thought afterwards. This was at the $25 max tables at Bodog.

I was in the big blind with 7s 6s. The player in second position, who was very loose, raised to 4xBB. Next was a fold, then another player called. Everyone else folded, and I called. Three of us saw the flop:

As Js 2s

I flopped a flush. Now, I liked this flop, because someone with an ace or a jack might not believe I hit the flush and might give me some action. However, I was also concerned about letting someone with a higher spade hit a flush on the turn or river. I had a decent hand, but I did not want to slowplay. I bet the size of the pot, $3.10.

The early limper folded, but the player behind me quickly raised the minimum, $3.10. He had a large stack, about two buy-ins, and I had about one. I didn't know much about him, but I tend to give big stacks the benefit of the doubt for being decent players, until I see otherwise.

My hope here was that he had a hand like two pair or a set, and might double me up. But I had a fairly low flush. If he had two spades he may very well have me drawing dead. I didn't want to get all my money in if that was the case, so I called, hoping to get more information on the turn.

The turn was 5c, a nice card for me. It was unlikely to help him, and if it did it would have been to make a hand I had beat, like a wheel straight. I was pretty confident I had the best hand. I was a little worried about him hitting a flush on the river if I gave him a free card, but I felt he would bet if I showed weakness. His bet on the flop felt like a semibluff or bluff, and I wanted to give him the opportunity to bluff at the pot again.

I checked, planning to call my entire stack if he set me all in. He made another of his very quick bets, this one for the size of the pot, $15.50. I had $21 left.

I stopped and thought this through a little. Folding was not an option I seriously considered. As I said, I was planning to call the rest of my chips if he set me all in. The choices I thought over were whether to call, or to raise my last $5.50.

The idea he might have a bigger flush crossed my mind. However, if you play scared, always worried about a bigger possible hand, you'll miss a lot of value bets on your non-nut hands. The key for me is not to be scared, but also to trust my instincts. I want to be able to lay down a big hand if I think I'm beat, which I did not do in the big pots I lost over the weekend.

In this case I didn't feel like I was beat. If he flopped a bigger flush, why would be be so quick to raise on the flop? Wouldn't he be more likely to want me to think he was weak? I've seen people make those quick raises on semibluffs many times, and the first rule of tells is that someone who wants to appear strong is probably weak, and vice versa. I felt like he was trying to push me off my hand, not induce me to move in.

I raised and what happened next actually surprised me. Instead of calling the last $5.50, with $45 in the pot, he quickly folded. I took down the pot, almost doubling my stack.

Looking back on the hand, I think he was on a stone cold bluff the whole time. The quick fold with one card to come indicated that he didn't have anything, not even a decent draw. If he had something like Ks, the pot would have been laying him plenty to call. If he had a hand like top pair, he might have even made the crying call on the river if he didn't believe I flopped the flush. He's getting almost 9:1 odds at that point. He only has to have the best hand 10% of the time for that to be a break-even move.

I know some players would criticize me for not playing the hand more aggressively. I could have moved in on the flop, and checking the turn had its risk. Had I shown more strength on either the flop or turn, though, he would have probably folded. I liked my hand enough on the turn to risk giving a free card. There was only about a 15% chance of a spade coming on the river, and even if that happened I felt I could get away without losing my whole stack. I had a chance of winning more by giving him the opportunity to bluff off his chips.

In other situations, a different play would have been better. I based my decisions on the hand not only on my cards and the board, but also my read on him and my instincts.

Ted

Preflop Agression with Suited Connectors

One of the issues I deal with sometimes when playing loose NLHE cash games is that I get too passive preflop. I limp a lot and hope to hit big hands that can bust someone, like sets, but sometimes I overdo it. That preflop passiveness can carry over into my postflop play, and I may also see my stack steadily dwindle if I'm missing, or being forced to fold by raises or reraises behind me.

Here's a very simple example of a potential drawing hand I played more aggressively preflop, and how it paid off. This won't be rocket science to experienced players, but it's a useful concept.

I was on the button with Th 8h, and two people limped in front of me. I wanted to raise. The point of the raise was not to shut everyone out, I was happy to have some potential customers in case I happened to hit a big hand. I decided to raise four times the big blind, not a big raise when two people have already limped into the pot.

The blinds both folded, and so did the first limper. The second one called.

The flop came 3s Ad 9c.

You might say this was a bad flop for me. I didn't hit a pair, and no hearts flopped. The big draws I was hoping for did not materialize. There was something good about this flop for me, though. An ace flopped, and since I raised preflop the other player may believe I hit my pair of aces.

The other player checked to me. I made a bet that was a little less than the size of the pot, and they folded.

I had ten high, which was quite possibly the worst hand, but because I continued my preflop aggression I won the pot. (People use the phrase "continuation bet" to describe that type of bet, when you bet the flop after raising preflop even if you miss.)

This idea of raising preflop with a drawing hand is a similar to the idea of semibluffing when you flop a draw. By raising preflop I gave myself another way to win. If I flopped a good draw I had a chance to make a big hand, and I could possibly get paid off well because my opponents might not put me on it. If I missed, I might be able to take the pot by representing that I hit.

If I limped preflop and saw the flop with three or four players they still may all check to me, but I am going to have a harder time convincing them that I have flopped something when I limped in from late position. I might make that same bet on the flop in this case and get called by one or more players. Then on the turn I'm probably left with either trying to put more pressure on to bluff them out, or giving up on the pot.

There are a couple of caveats here. First, I made this play from the best possible position. I'm not likely to open with a raise holding this hand under the gun :) I would much rather make this play from the back. Second, the continuation bet has a risk of its own -- you leave yourself vulnerable to a checkraise. For that reason some people would bet less than I did in that situation, possibly fifty or sixty percent of the pot. (In my case, I thought the other player had most likely missed, and I wanted to give him less of a reason to call.) And I would not recommend always making a continuation bet -- as with most things in poker, doing the same thing every time makes you too predictable. The same goes for even raising with hands like this -- use it to help mix up your play, not as the standard move.

I didn't pull a huge pot here, my profit was about seven big blinds. But compare that to losing one by limping and missing, and even making this play occasionally with some success can make a noticeable difference in your win rate.

Ted

Losing a Customer

I had taken a break from poker, but I've recently started playing again at the $100 buy-in NL tables at Bodog ($0.50/$1 blinds). I played a hand tonight that I think illustrates a couple of good points.

I opened for 3 times the big blind with my KK, and got two callers. Player A was in the small blind. He was a pretty bad player who had moved in both preflop and on the flop in previous hands when it wasn't necessary. Player B, the big blind, was fairly new to the table, but he had seen at least one of Player A's all ins.

The flop came 34T, two spades. Player A quickly moved all in for $36. That did not surprise me, but what happened next did. Player B moved all in as well for $94, almost a full buy-in.

I thought about this for a bit, and I was puzzled. The all in move preflop to isolate a player is not uncommon in tournaments, but that's a much different situation than a cash game. You can't rebuy in a tournament (unless it's a rebuy tourney), and the blinds are going up as the play progresses. In a cash game neither of those are true, and you generally don't want to get all of your money in unless you have a very strong hand.

The best guess I could make was that Player B had a somewhat strong hand, better than he put Player A on, but that he was afraid of me coming in. I might very well have the best hand. With only my preflop raise invested in the pot, though, and holding only an overpair, I couldn't call a bet there for almost my entire stack. I folded.

The cards were turned over. Player A had 99. Player B had 33, he had flopped a set.

Player B would have had me in serious trouble had I called. In fact, heads up for the side pot he was a 92% favorite with two cards to come. With a big overpair I might have gotten all my money in on the flop if he moved more gradually. Instead, he gave me a move that made my scratch my head briefly, but gave me a relatively easy fold.

Why did he do it? We can't be sure, but I have a couple of guesses. The first is the isolation play I mentioned. He is likely someone who has watched a lot of poker on tv, and has seen people make this move at the final table of big tournaments. He might not have played a lot of cash games, and may not understand the differences between them.

The second guess is that he was simply focused on Player A and wanted to bust him. He saw Player A's reckless play, caught a big hand, and wanted to crush him.

As he played it he made a profit of less than $50 on the hand. Not bad, but it could have been more like $150, one and a half buy-ins. Anyone who has played NL cash games and tracked their results knows that big pots like that make a real difference in your hourly win rate. You don't want to miss a 92% chance to double up.

The big lesson to be learned here is don't take the play of one other player personally, and don't get too focused on the play of one other player. There might be a bad or superagressive player in the hand, but if there are also other players you need to take them into consideration. It really hurts when you make a play at a bad player that even turns out to be right, but that same play cripples you against another player in the hand.

Ted

p.s. I have no explanation for Player A moving in on the flop, beyond my previous observations about the reasons people play badly. With 99 in his hand and a ten high flop, there was no reason to move in. Needless to say, he didn't last long at the table.